HE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

THE LIBERATION OF ITALY

A Radio Discussion by GIUSEPPE BORGESE
LOUIS GOTTSCHALK *and* RICHARD MCKEON

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Around the Round Table . . . .

GIUSEPPE ANTONIO BORGESE, now professor of Italian literature at the University of Chicago, was born in Polizzi Generosa (Palermo), Italy, and was educated at the University of Florence, receiving his Ph.D. there in 1903. Dr. Borgese has taught in Italy at the University of Rome and the University of Milan. As well as his interest in academic life, he has been closely associated with politics. During Orlando's premiership (1917–18), he was head of the Press and Propaganda Bureau. In 1918 he organized the Congress and Pact of Rome among nations of the Hapsburg monarchy and in the same year was head of the Italian delegation to the Inter-Allied Conference in London, in August. Professor Borgese was a leader of democratic opinion in Italy, calling for the League of Nations and the New Europe and strongly opposing nationalism and fascism. He refused to take the Fascist oath and, in 1931, left Italy and came to the United States, where in 1938 he became a citizen. Since being in this country, he has taught at the University of California, the New School for Social Research, and Smith College, as well as the University of Chicago. He is the author of many books on poetry, fiction, criticism, history, philosophy, and politics which were published in Italy. His first book in English was *Goliath: The March of Fascism* (1937), an authoritative work on fascism. Since then he has published *The City of Man* (in collaboration) (1940) and has contributed regularly to many periodicals.

LOUIS GOTTSCHALK, professor of modern history at the University of Chicago, is especially interested in the field of French history and is an interpreter of French-American relations. He is the author of *Jean Paul Marat: A Study in Radicalism* (1927), which has also appeared in French translation; *The Era of the French Revolution* (1929); *Lafayette Comes to America* (1935); *Lafayette Joins the American Army* (1937); *Lady-in-Waiting: The Romance of Lafayette and Aglaé de Hunolstein* (1939); and *Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution* (1942). Dr. Gottschalk received his A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from Cornell University and later was associated with the department of history there. He has taught at the University of Illinois and the University of Louisville and since 1925 has been associated with the University of Chicago. At the present time Dr. Gottschalk is also assistant editor of the *Journal of Modern History.*

RICHARD P. MCKEON, professor of Greek and philosophy at the University of Chicago, is also dean of the Division of Humanities at the University. Dean McKeon received his A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from Columbia University, and he also studied for three years at the University of Paris and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes in France. Besides the University of Chicago, he has also taught philosophy and Greek and Latin at Columbia University. He is the author of *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (1928) and *Studies in the History of Ideas*, Vol. III (co-author) (1935). He is also the editor and translator of *Selections from Mediaeval Philosophers*, Vol. I: *Augustine to Albert the Great* (1929); Vol. II: *Roger Bacon to William of Ockham* (1930); and *The Basic Work of Aristotle* (1941). He is a member of the board of editors of *Classical Philology* and the *Journal of the History of Ideas* and a contributor to numerous other journals and publications.

THE LIBERATION OF ITALY

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MR. GOTTSCHALK: Gentlemen, as you recall, when we started planning this program ten days ago it looked as if we should have to win against Italy entirely by military pressure. Since that time—to be exact, a week ago—it looked as if Italy would fall like a plum into the Allied lap by virtue of political maneuvers that had developed inside of Italy.

Now again, because of the developments in the last forty-eight hours, it begins to look as if we shall have to resort to military pressure again. McKeon, what is your opinion of that?

MR. MCKEON: The events that you refer to, Gottschalk, seem to me to emphasize all the more the fundamental question that we would have discussed ten days ago. We shall find as we proceed in this war, I'm convinced, that events, intervening events, will lay a confusing pall over our fundamental decisions. And this, therefore, will be a good test of the manner in which we'll proceed. What implications do you see in this, Borgese?

MR. BORGESE: In Italy I suppose that the war has entered a political-military phase, with an enormous, very strong accent on its political side.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: It seems, then, that this is going to be rather a complicated subject to discuss.

It seemed best to us to discuss it by considering questions that had been sent to the ROUND TABLE by ROUND TABLE listeners. Perhaps we'd better start first by listening to the first question.

ANNOUNCER: *After their landings in Sicily, the Allies set up a military government for the occupied territory.* ROUND TABLE *listeners ask: "What are the policies of our military government? Do our troops really bring democracy and freedom to conquered peoples? Are there any clues in the Sicilian occupation which have significance for our forthcoming occupation of Italy?"*

MR. GOTTSCHALK: The idea that democracy and freedom can be brought by military occupation seems to me in itself a contradiction. Military occupation cannot bring freedom. It can only bring lenient government. What is interesting about the Allied military government is that it is extraordinarily kind and patient.

MR. MCKEON: I think I'd emphasize that even more, Gottschalk. If you bear in mind what a military occupation is normally, it is a way, when it is a mild occupation, of living from the land; and it is not at all unusual in a military occupation to indulge in destruction, rapine, and all of the horrible consequences of war without too much criticism. We have, instead, planned a restoration.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Borgese, you are an American citizen of Sicilian birth. Your ideas on the occupation of Sicily would be extremely worth having.

MR. BORGESE: I am very glad in this tragic moment that, since my Sicilians had to go through a foreign occupation, this occupation

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is performed by the high Anglo-American civilization. Of course, the occupation does not look like a Nazi or Fascist one.

This praise comes from our hearts.

In spite of that, I think that it would be necessary to examine what are the principles that seem to be behind the initial actions of the Allied military occupation.[1]

I should like to mention a few points. You know, Gottschalk, that many in Britain and many in America have been suspicious about the reasons why people, however admirable from all points of view, like General Harold Alexander and the supreme chief, Rennell of Rodd, have been put at the head of this organization.

MR. MCKEON: Don't you think we ought to explain the functions of these persons to whom we refer, Gottschalk?

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[1] The Allied military government under General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, who was appointed military governor by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was constituted in Sicily through the agency of the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory, known as AMGOT. The personnel of this service, which presumably will rule all reoccupied territory liberated by the Allied armies, is British and American. AMGOT itself is headed by Major General Lord Rennell of Rodd of the British Army, who is chief of the civil affairs officers. Brigadier General Frank J. McSherry, of the United States Army, is the deputy chief civil affairs officer in the organization. AMGOT is to set up a government which will govern the people of the occupied provinces and cities of Sicily through their own officials who are not active members of the Fascist party. This presumably includes Fascists who changed sides when the Allies landed and hence are no longer "active" party members. The official statement declares "local officials will be kept in office on the basis of cooperation, performance and good behavior." AMGOT has ordered the abolition of the Fascist party in all occupied territory, and the ringleaders of fascism are to be removed from office. No political activity is permitted by AMGOT. Freedom of religious worship will be upheld, and the position of the Catholic church and all religious institutions will be respected. All laws which discriminate on the basis of race, color, or creed are to be annulled. Within military necessity, free press and free speech will be promulgated. Those accused of crimes against the Allies will be tried by Allied military courts under AMGOT. Exercise of the power of the Crown of Italy is suspended during the period of military occupation.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Well, Rennell of Rodd is the military chief under Alexander. Alexander, as general in command, has been designated by Eisenhower, the Allied chief commander, as the governor of Sicily.

I suppose Borgese's reference to Rennell of Rodd is to this effect: That his background is distinctly that of a banker and business chief, and, therefore, his tendency is to be conservative? Is that your point?

MR. BORGESE: He has been accused of being in strict connection with plutocratic interests and also of having been a friend of high-ranking Fascists like Volpi.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Another point, it seems to me, that might be made in criticism is the announcement to the effect that in Sicily the Crown has been suspended. That sounds as if it might be a liberal measure, but it would be much more liberal if they'd declared that the Crown had been abolished rather than suspended. "Suspended" seems to indicate that the Crown might some day come back.

MR. MCKEON: Well, there's a further negative provision that we shall use no refugees, no exiles, no men who have come to the various United Nations and who have lived and planned here. That seems further to involve a suspicion, partly justified, doubtless, but not fully examined.

MR. BORGESE: That concerns exiles or refugees who are abroad. But what concerns the Sicilians themselves is that they have been served a warning that no political activity will be tolerated in the occupied country. Now how is it possible to introduce democracy and freedom if any action from this side is discouraged?

MR. MCKEON: I think it all reduces to the basic notion, which

has been expressed repeatedly, that we shall try primarily to maintain public services, keep Italy in order; and to that end we must retain Fascists.

We have emphasized the technical. We've trained experts, and we've tried to continue our municipal governments. We have not considered the alternative policy.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: That raises another question which has been in the mind of ROUND TABLE listeners—the question regarding the character of our foreign policy for liberating Italy.

ANNOUNCER: *Roosevelt and Churchill at their Casablanca Conference announced that unconditional surrender would be demanded from the Axis.* ROUND TABLE *listeners ask: "In terms of Italy, what does unconditional surrender really mean? Does it mean that the Allies deal with the Badoglio government, the House of Savoy? Does unconditional surrender destroy fascism in Italy?"*

MR. MCKEON: Unconditional surrender can be defined quite definitely. It has two aspects. In the first place, it involves, since it is unconditional surrender, giving up everything; and therefore, in giving up everything, it involves a cessation of the government.

The importance I attach to this question, which was sent to us by the listeners to the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE, however, is precisely in the fact that no one's against unconditional surrender, and therefore it sounds like a policy. It isn't a policy, and we are therefore put in the rather curious position of talking about the conditions for unconditional surrender.

MR. BORGESE: I suppose that one should examine the documents—the most authoritative among them that give some meaning to this phrase "unconditional surrender."

The most important, until a couple of days ago, was Churchill's

speech in the House of Commons. He said—I am quoting him textually—"It would be a grave mistake, when Italian affairs are in this flexible, fluid, and formative condition, for the rescuing powers of Great Britain and the United States so to act as to break down the whole structure and expression of the Italian State."[2]

This implies that unconditional surrender is being dealt with under the condition that the conservative or even the reactionary or neo-Fascist state of Italy is upheld.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: On condition that they go slow, in other words. That gradualism is one point that seems to me needs to be brought out. Another is that there is a certain amount of inconsistency in the speeches and other manifestoes. For example, Mr. Roosevelt, in his speech of last Wednesday, made the statement, "No truck with fascism."[3] On the other hand, General Eisenhower's

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[2] "However, I must utter a word of caution. We do not know what is going to happen in Italy. Now Mussolini has gone and once the Fascist power is certainly and irretrievably broken, we should be foolish to deprive ourselves of any means of coming to general conclusions with the Italian nation.

"It would be a grave mistake, when Italian affairs are in this flexible, fluid, and formative condition, for the rescuing powers of Britain and the United States so to act as to break down the whole structure and expression of the Italian State. We certainly do not seek to reduce Italian life to a condition of chaos and anarchy, and find ourselves without any authority with whom to deal.

"By so doing we should lay upon our armies and upon our war effort the burden of occupying mile by mile the entire country, and of forcing an individual surrender of every army or coherent force in every district into which our troops might enter.

"An immense task of garrisoning, policing and administering would be thrown upon us, involving a grievous expenditure of power and still more of time" (from the speech by Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the House of Commons, July 27, 1943).

[3] "Our terms to Italy are still the same as our terms to Germany and Japan—'Unconditional surrender.'

"We will have no truck with Fascism in any way, shape or manner. We will permit no vestige of Fascism to remain.

"Eventually Italy will reconstitute herself. It will be the people of Italy who

proclamation announced that we were very grateful to the House of Savoy, as if the House of Savoy were not Fascist.

Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill talked about unconditional surrender, but Mr. Eisenhower has talked about the honorable terms that our Allies have given to Italy.[4]

MR. BORGESE: And on the same day on which the President of the United States said that there would be no truck with fascism, he scolded very severely the O.W.I. that had dared to attack Badoglio and the House of Savoy, which are Fascists.

MR. MCKEON: I'd like to issue a warning at this point against the too precise, the too technical, interpretation of all the words that are used in all communications, particularly communications of a military character.

I read, with great pleasure, the text of the warning which was issued by the Allied broadcast to the Italian people yesterday, and in that broadcast I noticed no reference, fortunately, to the House of Savoy; much criticism of the Badoglio government; but, in particular, the emphasis upon freedom and democracy in Italy.

The broadcast states: "We hope thereby, by giving the Italian

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will do that, choosing their own government in accordance with the basic democratic principles of liberty and equality" (from President Roosevelt's radio speech of July 28, 1943).

[4] "We commend the Italian people and the House of Savoy for ridding themselves of Mussolini, the man who involved them in the war as a tool of Hitler and brought them to the verge of disaster.

"The greatest obstacle which divided the Italian people from the United Nations has been removed by the Italians themselves.

"The only remaining obstacle on the road to peace is the German aggressor who is still on Italian soil.

"You want peace. You can have peace immediately and peace under honorable conditions which our governments have already offered you.

"We are coming to you as liberators" (from General Dwight D. Eisenhower's message to the Italian people, broadcast July 30, 1943).

people some time, to give Italy a breathing space wherein to unite for peace and freedom," and added the injunction to "save your lives and work for a free, democratic Italy."

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I, too, liked that statement, but it seemed to me wrung from a rather reluctant Allied government by the developments of the last week.

I like very much better the policy that Russia has adopted with regard to Germany, that is to say, the policy of trying to encourage Germans outside of Russia, outside of Germany, to create a free German government against the day when Germany, too, will collapse.

MR. MCKEON: I'd rather like to defend the position we've been taking on the assumption that unconditional surrender has two contexts. We've been talking about one, namely, what the relation is of an unconditional surrender to the honorable capitulation that has been referred to in Eisenhower's speeches and in others.

But, in the second place, our discussion is against a background of the Atlantic Charter, in which nationhood, the mild occupation of occupied territories, and the eventual encouragement of democratic forces is part of the program.

MR. BORGESE: Yes. The moment has come when one should be more precise about that. The generalities of the Atlantic Charter and of such other documents are inadequate to a situation that is growing as quickly and as decisively as the present one.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: The Atlantic Charter sounds a little hollow, even the Four Freedoms begin to sound as if they were meaningless, against the background of opportunism and military expediency that the Allied governments have taken, particularly with regard to North Africa and now, apparently, with regard to Italy. Our policy

of waging war, it seems, is to save lives rather than to achieve a definite aim.

Mr. McKeon: I think I'd agree with you there, and therefore the difference is rather in terms of the additional statement that I think we ought to add. We are trying to preserve an order—an order which will permit us to move into Italy—and we're not raising a question of the order—the democratic order—for which we are fighting. I doubt whether even military expediency is to be served by such pronouncements and such vaguenesses.

Mr. Borgese: That could be possible. There would be a great military advantage, whatever it might mean for a future peace, if we could be sure that we can occupy the whole of Italy as far as the Alpine ridge, before something more decisive and different from our intentions happens in Italy.

Mr. Gottschalk: Precisely. It seems to me if we don't have an aim in our foreign policy; we don't even know what is expedient. And what seems expedient at the moment may, in the end, cost us a great many more lives because of the fact that it may lead only to another war.

Mr. McKeon: This comes back to the point we made in the beginning, namely, the rapid change that has been worked in almost all of our judgments in the recent events. What has been the aftermath of the resignation of Mussolini?

Mr. Borgese: There are three Italys today—three powers in Italy, apart from the military occupation in Sicily. One is the old combine of the conservative and reactionary interests that are pillared around the church, some part of the Catholic hierarchy, the great landowners, the plutocratic interests, etc. The second is the intention of the will of the Italians that has begun to be very ex-

pressive in the riots or revolutionary movements of northern Italy. The third is the great unknown quantity—what will the Germans do? There are also Germans in Italy.

MR. MCKEON: There are not only those three parties in Italy, those three groups, but they're so intermingled that it is hard to separate the activities of one from the activities of the others.

It is absurd, for example, to expect the people to revolt when they have no indication either of the aid that they will receive or of the means that they will use.

MR. BORGESE: In brief, there is no policy that can guarantee to us the conquest of all the Italys that exist at this moment. A choice becomes imperative.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: It seems to me that it would be wise on the part of our government to make a clear-cut distinction as to where outstanding individuals in Italy stand. Our government seems to be confused; or, if they're not confused, they prefer to confuse others. For example, speaking of Badoglio as an anti-Fascist seems to me a sign either of misguidance or of confusion.

MR. BORGESE: Badoglio is less of an anti-Fascist than Darlan was. Badoglio was the Marshal of Mussolini. He was the man who conquered Ethiopia and thereby destroyed the build-up of the League of Nations and paved the way to the remilitarization of the Rhine. To speak of him as a foe of Mussolini is mere hoax.

MR. MCKEON: Even apart from this impressive record that you recall for Badoglio, I think the way in which we're grasping at straws is very well illustrated by the way in which in a single week Badoglio has become, first, a great anti-Fascist and then in today's paper the suspect of a deal, or at least a stall, to aid the Germans.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: And the same is quite true of the House of

Savoy in these proclamations, as you mentioned before. The first proclamation speaks in tones of congratulation of the House of Savoy; the second proclamation is careful to avoid mentioning the House of Savoy. You have definite opinions on the House of Savoy, I take it, Borgese.

MR. BORGESE: Yes. I'm sorry I have those definite opinions because it seemed as if one insisted too much on little men belonging to a little pedigree. But the fact is that at this moment they have become crucial because the House of Savoy is the test of whether we mean business against fascism or not.

Now to exclude the House of Savoy from the punishment, while the Italians take the blockbusters and a few—three or four or six Fascists—take the promise of a punishment, seems to me an offense to justice, and certainly the kind of action or inaction that will throw a pall of uncertainty in the eyes of the Italians.

MR. MCKEON: It's absurd, I think, to think of fascism as dead or to look for signs of its being dead, because a few men have resigned or been removed. The policy that I think should be enunciated can be stated definitely. We should stop hunting Fascists and begin our war on fascism.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I like the homely figure that has sometimes been used in describing fascism, that fascism is engaged in a fight. It has been knocked down for the count of seven or eight or nine, but it may rise yet to win the fight. Fascism certainly isn't dead so long as there are large numbers of Fascists whom we prefer to help hide.

MR. BORGESE: Yes. We can accept the opinion of McKeon that one should not be after Fascists but only after fascism. There are, though, a few personal and family exceptions—that is, combines

and interests that have been so strictly interwoven with the destiny of fascism that there cannot be any anti-fascism until they are out of the picture.

MR. MCKEON: We can recognize Fascists by means of fascism, and by warring against fascism we will not give up the fight against Fascists; but I think it is important also to recognize that fascism is not merely a doctrine or a pronouncement—it is an institution which has been spread in Italy for twenty years.

It's been pervasive. It's led to a passive attitude. It's led to the fear that the expression of free opinion (the attitude which we associate with democratic communication and association) would be rewarded only by the punishment of castor oil or a concentration camp. That's the fascism we should be hunting, not the fascism of a few pronunciamentos issued from a few high places.

MR. BORGESE: And the fascism that you are so aptly describing had the high authorities of the conservative estate in Italy, and especially the monarchy, as necessary and indispensable accomplices.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Well, gentlemen, we seem to be doing pretty well on the destructive criticism. Perhaps we ought to raise the question of what we would suggest by way of constructive criticism. What ought the policy of the United States to be with regard to this anti-Fascist war? That question is raised by the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE listeners.

ANNOUNCER: *Last night, as Dean McKeon has mentioned, the Allied military radio warned Italy of new air attacks to come and urged Italians to "save your lives and work for a free, democratic Italy."*

ROUND TABLE *listeners ask these questions: "What action can we expect from Italians in establishing a truly free and democratic Italy?*

Should we urge the Italians to join our forces in fighting against Germany? What would be an effective Allied program permanently to stamp out fascism?"

MR. BORGESE: Something better at any rate should be done than to present the Italians with the dilemma of surrender or being bombed. The United Nations should speak to them candidly and strongly. They should assure them that they will really have freedom and that that freedom includes the liberty of establishing the government that they desire for the nation, even if that government should be a strongly progressive republic. There should also be given to them assurance that all the rumors about dismemberment of Italy and the annexation of Italian countries by the victor powers are rumors of Nazi-Fascist origin and that the United Nations most positively discard them.

MR. MCKEON: I not only agree with this positive statement of policy, Borgese, but it seems to me, also, to be the best means of expediency. We are paying, I think, a very great price by failing to make use of the democratic ideals that are guiding us in Italy. We are creating a suspicion of our intentions. We are creating a situation in which the Italians might very well confuse the institutions we advocate with Fascist institutions.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: The reason, it seems to me, why our governments have been so much impressed by a policy of gradualism (taking things slowly) is their fear of disorder, the danger that there might be a great social revolution inside Italy and other areas that are occupied.

In regard to that I should like to comment that the danger of disorder becomes greater rather than less by a policy of gradualism. If we don't allow these people freedom to do with themselves what they wish, they are more likely to go to extremes.

ITALY

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0 25 50 75 100 MILES
0 25 50 75 100 KILOMETERS
TURIN
MILAN
BRESCIA
PAVIA
VERONA
PADUA
GENOA
VENICE
TRIESTE
FIUME
SPEZIA
BOLOGNA
PISA
R. ARNO
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by Harold Haydon

Mr. Borgese: That is perfectly true concerning Italy as concerning any other country in Europe in the near future. If we do not want to open all of Europe to the dreaded influence of extremist revolution and, as they say, of Russia, then we have to let them be free to do something on the middle of the road. There are some chances for that. We should not neglect them; we should encourage them.

Mr. McKeon: We were talking throughout this program, it seems to me, of two orders. If we are to avoid communism, either we can do it cautiously, by imposing an order—and that seems to me to have been shown in recent history to be a complete fallacy—or we can avoid communism and the dangers of communism by setting up an attitude—an attitude in which the Italian people will take the lead.

I think, however, this is a point at which we might very well be detailed and practical. What kind of a policy should we advocate at this moment? It seems to me that we have two problems which we ought to separate—the problem of a local program and a national program.

Mr. Borgese: McKeon, I suppose that you know that there is already something like a united front of anti-Fascist parties in northern Italy that have even published proclamations. It is true that a Communist party has a share in that. But there is also a Christian-Democrat party, a liberal Party of Reconstruction; a moderate Socialist party; and a Party of Action, which seems to be the most important of them all, which has a very acceptable program with much hope for the future. Why do we not get in touch with them? Why do we deal only with what is crumbling and not with what is being born?

Mr. Gottschalk: Exactly! In view of the fact that we now are

beginning to be aware of the existence of a very widespread anti-Fascist population inside of Italy, it would seem to me that in local affairs it would be relatively easy to find a number of people who would be able to become, let's say, the mayors of the villages and cities.

To be sure, we'd have to leave the street cleaner in his alley, and the policeman on his beat, and the postman on his beat, but we might replace them gradually, if we found that they were distinctly Fascist. But they don't matter so much if there's a national over-all policy against fascism.

MR. MCKEON: Let's emphasize that local separation. I think that's extremely important, since fascism is important all the way down the line, not merely the party leaders but the leaders in the towns, in the small communities, in the cities.

Let us look not only for the order which will continue municipal functions, but let us look for those men who can be encouraged by the use of free speech to prepare in their local communities for a democratic order—an order which will not necessarily be the continuation merely of municipal functions. There may be some disorder in their municipal functions, but we must set up the democratic order.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: We've got to run the risk of a certain amount of disorder to achieve democracy. After all, we ran some risk in the United States to achieve our democracy back in 1776.

It seems to me inevitable that when our armies go in they're going to establish a military regime; but that military regime should be turned over, as quickly as possible, to free Italians, to run it provincially until such a time as a free election can take place.

MR. BORGESE: Which cannot be done unless centers of national organization, even if provincial, are not officially recognized.

Among them, one of them can be the free Italian government of which you, Gottschalk, were speaking. Others might be these united parties in northern Italy. Others can be the local elements to which McKeon referred. But something must be done.

MR. MCKEON: Let us emphasize three steps then. I personally should not be disposed to criticize the policy or the method of organization of the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory. They have a problem which is a military problem, and I leave the question of the best achievement of those ends to military authorities.

I appreciate, and I am entirely in sympathy with, the ends of freedom; but the middle period, the period in which the Italian people are to be prepared for freedom—that is the period which has not yet been considered.

MR. BORGESE: Because we have not yet considered what our final aim should be. The final aim is to get Italy not out of the war but within the war as our ally and as one of the United Nations.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Gentlemen, the time has come for me to summarize what we have tried to do.

We've taken up three separate questions. With regard to the first question, concerning the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory, we seem to be agreed that, despite the fact that there are many good things to be said in favor of the Allied military government, nevertheless it is subject to certain criticisms that we have indicated.

The second question that we have dealt with has been the character of our foreign policy for liberating Italy. With regard to that we indicated that there were certain inconsistencies. The inconsistencies come, apparently, from a lack of an over-all aim in our foreign policy and, moreover, because of a desire on our part, on the part of the United Nations, to go slow, to do these things step by step,

taking advantage of the opportunities as they occur rather than fitting the opportunities into a larger objective—an aim which ought to be (as the United Nations have previously announced) in keeping with the larger program of the Atlantic Charter.

The third point that we've taken up is what should be the policy of the United Nations in an anti-Fascist war. There we have indicated that it is our impression that, if a free Italian government were created now (even though it is rather late but not yet too late), it might be conceivable that that government would be able to tide over, without too much disorder, to the time when the Italians can themselves take over.

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More on This Topic

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STURZO, LUIGI, "Italy after Mussolini," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1943. *A survey of the anti-Fascist groups in Italy.*

"What Conquest of Italy Would Mean to the Allies," *United States News*, July 23, 1943. *Occupation as a test of United States training in military government.*

What Do *You* Think?

1. In your opinion what is the importance of Italy as the first test case of liberation in this war? In what way does military necessity complicate the fundamental problem of liberation?

2. What are the policies of the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory? Should the Italian Crown have been abolished rather than suspended by the Allied Military Government in Sicily? Should all political activity be suppressed by the Military Government? Discuss.

3. Do you agree with Mr. McKeon that "unconditional surrender isn't a policy, and we are therefore put in the rather curious position of talking about the conditions for unconditional surrender"? Is the term "unconditional surrender" an obstacle to general public discussion of the issues of freedom and the kind of conditions of liberation that the United Nations desire to see imposed upon Italy?

4. Do you agree with Mr. Borgese that "something better should be done than [presenting] the Italians with the dilemma of surrender or being bombed"? Should a Free Italy movement be created and recognized by the United Nations? Should the United Nations repudiate the House of Savoy and encourage a strongly progressive republic in Italy?

5. Do you agree with Mr. Gottschalk that the reason that a policy of gradualism in Italian politics has been adopted by the Anglo-American governments is the fear of disorder and "the danger that there might be a great social revolution inside of Italy and other areas that are occupied"? What should be the American policy toward a revolution within Italy? Discuss.

6. Do you think that Mussolini and the Fascists have so changed Italy in the last twenty years that there is no hope for Italian democracy? Or have twenty years of tyranny only increased their desire for democracy?

7. In your opinion what are the principles of fascism? Is fascism dead in Italy with the resignation of Mussolini? Should this be a war against fascism as well as against Fascists? Should the ultimate aim of Allied policy be that of bringing a free Italy into the war as an ally of the United Nations?



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

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

The People Say....

The following letters are representative of the views expressed by the ROUND TABLE *audience on "Puerto Rico," broadcast July 25, 1943.*

*

Solution

Puerto Rico's problem is poverty and faulty distribution—but I waited in vain for one of your participants to suggest a solution that is workable.

Removal of all tariff barriers, removal of monopolization of land and resources, and free enterprise without any governmental restrictions is the solution for Puerto Rico.

Don't take away the land from the sugar planters. Let them keep it, for they are necessary for their sugar industry, and just taking away the land would solve nothing. Instead, have them pay the full rental value of those lands and resources.

Every person on the island—the most hungry and illiterate person—has as much right to the land as the owner of the plantation. But if the owner pays the full rental value, then the other man will not be hungry and illiterate.....

Puerto Rico is a place which should be taken off our governmental "experimental list," and should be permitted to function simply, naturally, along open and honest lines of free enterprise.—*A listener from New York, New York.*

*

Politics

I think the one thing needed most in Puerto Rico is not so much politics in the choice of a Governor.

Puerto Rico needs a man who could forget himself and see the importance of the Island as a safeguard to the Canal and a credit to the United States.

There are many beautiful schools in Puerto Rico and my nephew taught in one of them.—*A listener from Clarion, Pennsylvania.*

Need for Knowledge and Understanding

Your discussion of Puerto Rico interested me greatly because I spent five years on the neighboring island of St. Thomas. On our visits to Puerto Rico we were impressed with its scenic beauty, its agricultural advantages over our own St. Thomas.....

The officials from the island had shades of meaning in their statements in the discussion which escape listeners having no experience with the island and its peculiar inhabitants.

I gathered that to satisfy their pride the Puerto Ricans want independence but that they are actually afraid to cut away from the emoluments and the practical guidance afforded by a connection with this government. They want to stand alone, but they know they are not ready.

These people are Spanish with a sense of Spanish honor and integrity unlike our standards. Their illiteracy hampers rapid progress. American methods do not work with them. They are what we call lazy, shiftless. Hookworm prevails. According to our standards they are unmoral.

The suggestions of the participants were practical. Prepare the island for tourist travel. Introduce American-managed industries, unhampered by our continental industrial laws and subject to island management. Let them elect the governor and the Council. But let all practical planning be done by Puerto Ricans or by Americans of real Puerto Rican experience. Practical common sense and not idealistic dreams will solve their problems. —*A listener from Lemon Grove, California.*

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

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2:00 P.M. EASTERN WAR TIME

City	*Call Letters*	*Kilo-cycles*	*City*	*Call Letters*	*Kilo-cycles*
Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Martinsville, Va.	WMVA	1450
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Bluefield, W.Va.	WHIS	1440	Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060
Boston, Mass.	WBZ	1030	Pittsburgh, Pa.	KDKA	1020
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Charleston, W.Va.	WGKV	1490	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Cincinnati, Ohio	WLW	700	Reading, Pa.	WEEU	850
Clarksburg, W.Va.	WBLK	1400	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Springfield, Mass.	WBZA	1030
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Syracuse, N.Y.	WSYR	570
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Greenwood, S.C.	WCRS	1450	Toledo, Ohio	WSPD	740
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400	Williamsport, Pa.	WRAK	1400
Harrisburg, Pa.	WKBO	1230	Wilmington, Del.	WDEL	1150
Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240	York, Pa.	WORK	1350

1:00 P.M. CENTRAL WAR TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970
Bismark, N.D.	KFYR	550	Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1310
Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230
Dallas, Texas	WFAA	820	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Des Moines, Iowa	WHO	1040	Mobile, Ala.	WALA	1410
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	Montgomery, Ala.	WSFA	1440
Eau Claire, Wis.	WEAU	1070	Nashville, Tenn.	WSM	650
El Paso, Texas	KSTM	1380	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WOWO	1190	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
Hattiesburg, Miss.	WFOR	1400	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Hibbing, Minn.	WMFG	1240	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Houston, Texas	KPRC	950	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
Indianapolis, Ind.	WIRE	1430	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
La Crosse, Wis.	WKBH	1410	Virginia, Minn.	WHLB	1400
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920	Wichita, Kan.	KANS	1240

12:00 M. MOUNTAIN WAR TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	770	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	790	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Safford, Ariz.	KGLU	1450
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240	Yuma, Ariz.	KYUM	1240

11:00 A.M. PACIFIC WAR TIME

Bakersfield, Cal.	KERN	1410	Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1530
Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Diego, Cal.	KFSD	600
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620			

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Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1230	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Milwaukee, Wis.	WTMJ	620	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Minneapolis, Minn.	WLB	770	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810

BY TRANSCRIPTION VIA SHORT WAVE

Anchorage, Alaska	KFQD	790	Juneau, Alaska	KINY	1450
Fairbanks, Alaska	KFAR	610	Ketchikan, Alaska	KTAN	930



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

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LIPPMANN, WALTER, "U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic," *Reader's Digest*, July, 1943.

PEFFER, NATHANIEL, "The Split in Our Foreign Policy," *Harper's*, August, 1943.

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